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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 900484-CA

v.
Category No* 2

GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF
The following points are submitted in reply to the
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief.
REPLY TO POINT I
THIS COURT, EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION, SHOULD
CONSIDER ABANDONING THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE IN
THE CONTEXT OF INVESTIGATORY STOPS OF
VEHICLES; ALTERNATIVELY, IT SHOULD CLARIFY
THE DOCTRINE AS ADOPTED IN STATE V. SIERRA.
A. Waiver
In Part A of Point I in defendant's brief, he argues
that the State is procedurally barred from arguing that this
Court should abandon the pretext stop doctrine it adopted in
State v. Sierra, 752 P.2d 972, 977-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990).
First, he argues that, because the State asserted in
the trial court that the Sierra pretext analysis controlled the
resolution of defendant's pretext challenge, its invitation to
this Court to abandon Sierra is inconsistent with its position

below and therefore should not be considered on appeal.

The

basic flaw in this argument is that the State could not ask the
trial court to overrule or not follow Sierra, the lower court
having no authority to do so. £f. State v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv.
Rep. 21, 25 n.2 (Utah July 3, 1991) ("[T]he court of appeals has
no power to overrule a decision of this Court.").

Therefore, the

State can properly ask this Court to reconsider Sierra as part of
this appeal, even though it did not raise the issue below.
Second, defendant argues that the State's invitation to
reconsider Sierra should not be addressed because that issue was
not included in the State's petition for permission to appeal.
This argument is more substantial.

The State concedes that it

did not include that issue in its petition.

Quite simply, the

issue was not apparent to the State at the time the petition was
filed.

While this Court could appropriately decline to address

this issue due to its absence in the petition, there is nothing
in rule 5(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that prohibits
the Court from addressing the point in spite of the defect in the
State's petition.

And, even if rule 5(e) could be read in such a

manner, rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, would allow
consideration of the issue under a suspension of the rules.
Because the issue is an important one, and has bcsen analyzed
thoroughly by defendant, the Court, in its discretion, should
address the issue.
B. Retention of the Pretext Stop Doctrine
In explaining why the pretext doctrine is important,
2

defendant relies on certain passages from Sierra and State v.
Holmes, 256 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1972), which discuss primarily the
evils of pretextual arrests,
stops.

as opposed to pretextual traffic

Br, of Appellee at 12-14.

The quotes from Sierra require

some analysis.
The Sierra Court recognized that "it is impermissible
for law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor arrest

as a

pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime."

754

P.2d at 977 (citing United States v. Millio, 588 F. Supp. 45, 49
(W.D.N.Y. 1984)) (emphasis added).

The obvious danger with

pretextual misdemeanor arrests is that when an arrest occurs, the
police may, incident to the arrest and without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, conduct a complete search of the
arrested person.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

Furthermore, the police may, incident to an arrest and without

reasonable

suspicion

or probable

cause,

search the

passenger

compartment of a vehicle and any containers found within the
passenger compartment.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

Thus, because the potential for intrusion on an individual's
privacy interests is so great when an arrest is made, courts are
justifiably concerned with the threat posed by pretextual
misdemeanor traffic arrests.

However, Sierra extended the

pretext arrest doctrine to the traffic

stop

situation, where the potential for lawful intrusion on an

3
)

individual's privacy interests is not nearly so great.1
"[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a
computer check, and issue a citation.

However, once the driver

has produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement
to use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on his way
without being subject to further delay by police for additional
questioning.'"
App. 1990).

State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.

Any further investigative detention is justified

1

Without discussing this distinction, the Sierra Court, in
the passage quoted by defendant at page 14 of his brief,
inappropriately inserted the words "pretextual traffic stop" in
quoted text from Professor LaFave's treatise on search and
seizure. LaFave, noting that there is a "powerful reason for
being concerned about the unquestioned application to traffic
violation cases of the 'general authority' to search incident to
arrest," states:
"There is . . . always the possibility that a
police officer, lacking probable cause to
obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic
arrest as a pretext to conduct a search."
Given the fact . . . that "in most
jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses
the determination of whether to issue a
citation or effect a full arrest is
discretionary with the officer," and that
"very few drivers can traverse any
appreciable distance without violating some
traffic regulation," this is indeed a
frightening possibility.
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 5.2(e) at 457-58 (2d ed. 1987)
(footnote citation omitted). The Sierra Court's insertion of
"pretextual traffic stops" in brackets after the word "this" near
the end of the quoted section, 754 P.2d at 979, is inaccurate, in
that LaFave is discussing only a pretextual traffic arrest
and
the search conducted incident thereto, not a pretextual traffic
stop where the police have no automatic right to conduct a
suspicionless, warrantless search of either the person or the
vehicle.
4

under the fourth amendment only if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.

Ibid.

In short, there are clear

restrictions on the scope of a traffic stop, and the intrusion on
an individual's privacy interests during such a stop is not
nearly as substantial as the intrusion associated with a full
custodial traffic arrest.
Accordingly, the State's argument that this Court
should abandon the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is directed
only at traffic stops and does not extend to misdemeanor traffic
arrests.

The State shares defendant's concern that a misdemeanor

traffic arrest could be misused by a police officer as a pretext
to conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested person and
his or her vehicle without reasonable suspicion, probable cause,
or a warrant.

While an officer appears to have the authority to

arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation under Utah law2, that
clearly is not the usual practice.
The position set forth in State v. Olaiz, 100 Or.App.
380, 786 P.2d 734 (Or. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or.
1990), which was decided under the fourth amendment and article
I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution3, should be adopted by

2

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990) and Utah Code Ann. §
77-7-18 (Supp. 1991). But see United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d
812, 816 n.l (10th Cir. 1991) (M[I]t appears that Utah law does
not allow an officer in these circumstances to make a custodial
arrest for a speeding violation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-18 et
seq.")•
3

Article I, section 9 is Oregon's state constitutional
counterpart to the fourth amendment and is similar in that
respect to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
5

this Court.

There, two police officers were conducting

surveillance of a Portland motel room associated with drug
dealing when they saw the defendant and a passenger drive up and
look in the window.

When the defendant drove away, the officers

followed him, hoping to be led to the persons who had been
selling narcotics out of the room.

Eventually, the officers

stopped the defendant for speeding so that they could identify
him and his passenger and gather information.
the defendant for his driver's license and
a little fast."

One officer asked

,r

told him he was going

The defendant replied that he had no license and

presented several traffic tickets to the officer.

At that point,

the other officer indicated that the defendant's passenger was
smoking marijuana.

When asked if he had any marijuana, the

defendant replied that he had none and offered to allow the
officer to search the car.

A subsequent search produced a

quantity of tar heroin, and defendant was arrested for drug
crimes.

786 P.2d at 735.
The defendant argued that the initial stop for speeding

was pretextual n[b]ecause a reasonable officer . . . would not
have stopped defendant in the absence of a desire to gather drug
intelligence.H

786 P.2d at 736.

The court rejected this

argument, citing the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 595 P.2d 1364 (1979), which "held that a
traffic stop is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment 'simply
because, in addition to probable cause to arrest for a specific
offense (or to stop for purposes of issuing a citation), the
6

officer also has a suspicion which contributes to the decision to
make the stop.'"
1364).*

Ibid, (quoting Tucker, 286 Or. at 493, 595 P.2d

The Olaiz court quoted the following language from

Tucker and concluded that the Oregon Supreme Court's "reasoning
is as sound under Article I, section 9 [of the Oregon
Constitution] as it is under the Fourth Amendment":
[We do not] believe that determining the
validity of an otherwise authorized stop on
the basis of the officer's purpose, or
primary purpose, in making it would be either
practical or desirable.
•

. . •

[T]his approach would be unworkable. Any
time evidence of criminal activity came to
light during a routine traffic stop, trial
courts would be called upon to decide whether
the officer had noticed anything about the
violator or the vehicle beyond the fact of
the violation itself, and, if so, whether he
would have made the stop upon the
hypothetical supposition that he had noticed
nothing.
786 P.2d at 736-37 (quoting Tucker, 286 Or. at 493, 495, 595 P.2d
1364).

In short, "[w]hether the officers would have stopped

defendant for speeding (or for a more serious infraction, had one
occurred) without their desire to know more about the car's
occupants is irrelevant."

JLd. at 737.

Finally, specifically addressing the defendant's
pretext stop argument under the state constitution, the court
noted that "'[a]n officer who stops a vehicle when he sees its
A

See also State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (citing Tucker with approval and stating: "The fact that
Officer Smith's attention was initially drawn to the defendant's
car because of what he considered suspicious activity in a highcrime area does not insulate the defendant from being stopped for
a traffic violation.").
7

operator commit a traffic violation does not interfere with the
operator's freedom of movement based only on the officer's
'standardless and unconstrained discretion,'" and that "once the
officer has made the stop, unless circumstances arise that give
cause to inquire further, his activities are limited to ones
related to the traffic stop."

Ibid, (quoting Tucker, 286 Or. at

492, 595 P.2d 1364).5
C. Clarification of Sierra Pretext Stop Doctrine
If the Court retains Sierra's pretext stop doctrine, it
should clarify the doctrine's operation.

Although the parties

agree on this point, they differ on how the pretext stop doctrine
should be applied.
The following areas require clarification:

(1) Is the

subjective intent of the officer relevant to the determination of
whether a pretext stop has occurred?

(2) Which party has the

ultimate burden of proof on the pretext stop issue?
On the question of whether the officer's subjective
intent should be considered in determining if a pretext stop has
occurred, Sierra correctly states that "the subjective intent of
the officer is irrelevant."

754 P.2d at 977. This is entirely

consistent with the "hypothetical reasonable officer" test which
is a purely objective test.

JEd. at 977-78. The problem has not

been with the Court's statement of the law, but rather, as noted

5

Olaiz's traffic stop analysis is independent from the
traditional pretext arrest analysis which, as the State has
argued for here, remains as a viable separate doctrine in Oregon.
See Tucker, 286 Or. at 490 n.4, 595 P.2d at 1367 n.4.
8

in the State's opening brief, with its application of the law.
The Court simply has not consistently adhered to the principle
that the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to the pretext
stop inquiry.

See Br. of Appellant at 13. Therefore, the Court

should make absolutely clear that an officer's subjective intent
will not be considered.
The Court should reject defendant's argument that the
officer's subjective intent is an appropriate consideration.

If

subjective intent is included in the equation, the hypothetical
reasonable officer test no longer exists, and the door is opened
for testimony from police officers who, as noted by defendant,
M

can readily adapt their testimony to reflect the state of mind

necessary to justify the scope of their actions."

Br. of

Appellee at 17 (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512,
1516 (10th Cir. 1988)).

An objective test, which does not take

into account the officer's motives —

good or bad, is simply more

susceptible to consistent application, which promotes the
development of clear principles of law that are more easily
recognized and followed by law enforcement.
As to the second question on which party carries the
ultimate burden of proof on the pretext issue, the State has
argued in another case pending before this Court, State v. Salas,
No. 900418-CA (set for oral argument August 29, 1991), that
"[wjhen alleging that a pretext stop has occurred, a defendant
should bear the burden of proving that allegation, once the State
has born[e] its original burden of showing the constitutionality
9

of the stop (i.e. that the police officer had reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to believe that the defendant was
violating the law)."

Br. of Appellee (citing State v. Loveqren,

798 P.2d 767, 771 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (which suggests that,
when alleging a pretext stop, a defendant bears some burden in
showing that a hypothetical reasonable officer would not have
made a particular traffic stop); United States v. Lewis, 910 F.2d
1367, 1371 (7th Cir. 1990)).

While defendant makes a reasonable

argument for a contrary rule, it appears to conflict with
footnote 10 of Loveqren.

But see State v. Vigil/ 164 Utah Adv.

Rep. 28, 31 (Utah Ct. App. June 21, 1991) ("We are precluded from
meaningful review of whether the state met its burden to show . .
. the initial stop was actually pretextual . . . . " ) .

In any

event, the Court needs to clarify who has the ultimate burden of
proof on the pretext stop question.
REPLY TO POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD NOT RULE THAT THE STATE HAS
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE
ADEQUACY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ON THE
SUPPRESSION ISSUES.
Defendant argues that the State, by failing to object
below to the adequacy of the trial court's findings, has waived
its right to request on appeal a remand for adequate findings as
required under State v. Loveqren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

However, an appealing party's failure to object to

the adequacy of the trial court's findings on suppression issues
has never resulted in automatic affirmance of the lower court's
ruling, which appears to be the result defendant argues for, in
10

that he cannot seriously claim that the trial court's findings
are the detailed findings required under Lovegren or that
meaningful review could proceed based on those findings. When
the findings are inadequate, this Court has consistently remanded
the case for adequate findings so that the appealing party's
claims can be meaningfully reviewed.

E.g. State v. Vigil, 164

Utah Adv. Rep. at 31; Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 770. The same
procedure should apply here.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should
reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand the case
for entry of adequate findings of fact which should include a
ruling only on whether the vehicle stop was lawful under Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Alternatively, the Court should remand the case for
entry of adequate findings of fact and consideration of whether
the stop of defendant was pretextual under the standard set forth
*

in State v. Sierra.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this j £ _ T d a y of August, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General
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